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The aim of this paper is to assess whether cost-containment has been affected by 
recent pharmaceutical reimbursement reforms that have been introduced in the 
Spanish health care system over the period 1996-2002, under the conservative 
Popular Party government. Four main reimbursement policies can be observed in the 
Spanish pharmaceutical market after 1996, each of them largely unintegrated with 
the other three. First, a second supplementary negative list of excluded 
pharmaceutical products was introduced in 1998. Second, a reference pricing system 
was introduced in December 2000, with annual updating and enlargement. Third, the 
pharmacies’ payment system has moved from the traditional set margin on the 
consumer price to a margin that varies according to the consumer price of the product, 
the generic status of the product, and the volume of sales by pharmacies. And fourth, 
general agreements between the government and the industry have been reached 
with cost containment objectives. In the final section of this paper we present an 
overall assessment of the impact of these pharmaceutical reimbursement policies on 
the behaviour of the agents in the pharmaceutical market. 
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Incentives and Pharmaceutical Reimbursement 






Although the Spanish health care system stands among the eight highest out of 191 
countries as regards performance, according to the controversial results published by 
the World Health Organisation [6], health care reform ranks very high on the Spanish 
political agenda.  
 
The Spanish health care system would appear to perform quite well in terms of 
aggregate financing and overall traditional health indicators. In 1999, Spain showed 
one of the highest life expectancies at birth in OECD countries (74.9 years for males 
and 82.4 for females). At the same time, health expenditure remained at a relatively 
moderate level: total health expenditure accounted for 7% of GDP in 1998, and public 
health expenditure accounted for 5.4% of GDP.  
 
However, what is observed at the macro level (relative efficiency) is not necessarily 
true at the micro level. Nowadays, in the Spanish health care system several problems 
negatively affect efficiency incentives at the organisational and at the individual level. 
There is a vast array of evidence of low allocative efficiency and absence of cost 
containment incentives in public procurement agencies, in publicly financed provider 
organisations and in clinical decisions. Some of the more outstanding of these 
problems are closely related to the level and composition of pharmaceutical 
consumption.  
   3 
The more relevant recent trends in Spanish pharmaceutical expenditure can be 
inferred from the data depicted in Table 1. Political concern regarding Spanish 
pharmaceutical expenditure usually arises from the observation of what is interpreted 
as the high proportion of public health care expenditure devoted to pharmaceuticals. 
This proportion increased from 16.2% in 1990 to 21.7% in 1999, which represents an 
increase of 5.5 points in nine years. It is the third highest in the European Union 
(EU), only Greece and Portugal showing higher levels. The average of this proportion 
for the EU countries, excluding Austria and Belgium, showed a more moderate level 
and trend, increasing only from 12.2% in 1990 to 13.5% in 1997 (1.3 points in seven 
years). However, this measure simply represents the average relative combination of 
pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical inputs in health service production. Thus, 
the observed proportion of public health resources devoted to pharmaceuticals on the 
Spanish market cannot be easily interpreted as an efficiency indicator, given that the 
optimal proportion depends on the relative price and the relative marginal 
productivity of pharmaceuticals in relation to the other health care inputs.    
 
[ Insert Table 1 about here ] 
 
 
Total pharmaceutical expenditure per capita in Spain was  US$ 246 per capita in 
1997, a figure that is slightly below the average of the European Union (EU) countries 
(US$ 260 in 1997). Private expenditure on pharmaceuticals, including co-payments, 
represented nearly 30% of total private health care expenditure i n 1998. Two 
significant features of Spanish pharmaceutical expenditure should be highlighted 
from the point of view of public financing.  
 
First, the most important difference between Spanish pharmaceutical expenditure 
and that of the European Union as a whole is the relatively high and increasing rate 
of public financing in the former. The proportion of pharmaceutical expenditure that 
is publicly financed increased from 71.7% in 1990 to 78.1% in 1997 (6.4 points in seven   4 
years). This tendency does not only reflect a lower proportion of pharmaceuticals 
privately financed outside the public system; it was also accompanied by a major 
decrease in the effective co-payment rate from 11% in 1990 to 7.1% in 2000, which 
represents a 35.5% decrease in ten years.  
 
Second, average price per prescription has been increasing very fast in recent years, 
despite the fact that drug prices are under strict price control. Average cost per 
prescription doubled in current monetary units between 1990 and 2000. Drugs prices 
in Spain are still among the lowest in the EU [18] and the Spanish market is an 
important source of parallel trade in the EU. Although regulated market price 
increases fall short of the inflation rate, the average prescription price has risen 
steadily, owing mainly to drugs recently introduced on to the market at high prices. 
  
As a result of these trends, public pharmaceutical expenditure per capita rose from 
US$ 104 in 1990 to 192 in 1997, by which time it was 18% higher than the average for 
the EU, despite the fact that Spanish per capita income was 23% lower than the EU 
average. From the macro perspective, these data clearly indicate that the main 
difference between Spanish pharmaceutical and that of the EU countries as a whole 
lies in the level and trend of public financing.  
 
Health care policy under the conservative Popular Party, in power since March 1996, 
has seen the introduction of important regulatory changes in pharmaceutical 
financing and regulation1. The main concern of recent pharmaceutical policies has 
been cost containment through the introduction of more complex public 
reimbursement or procurement mechanisms.  
 
The aim of this paper is to describe and assess the likely effects of some recent 
pharmaceutical reforms that have been introduced in the Spanish health care system 
                                                                   
1  An overview of Spanish health care reforms in the late 1980s and until the second half of the 1990s 
may be found in the literature published English in [5; 10; 17; 18].   5 
over the period 1996-2002, under the conservative Popular Party government. 
Pharmaceutical public spending is recognised as one of the main cost containment 
targets in the financing of the Spanish health care system, and consequently it has 
deserved increasing political and media interest in recent years. Four main public 
policies can be observed in the Spanish pharmaceutical market after 1996. First, a 
second supplementary negative list of excluded pharmaceutical products was 
introduced in 1998. Second, a reference pricing system was introduced in December 
2000, with annual updating and enlargement. Third, the pharmacies’ payment system 
has moved from the traditional set margin on the consumer price to a margin that 
varies according to the consumer price of the product, the generic status of the 
product, and the volume of sales by pharmacies. And fourth, general agreements 
between the government and the industry have been reached with cost containment 
objectives. In the final section of this paper we present an overall assessment of the 
impact of these pharmaceutical reimbursement policies on the behaviour of the agents 
in the pharmaceutical market. 
 
As in most social processes, it is difficult to evaluate pharmaceutical reimbursement 
reforms in Spain, i.e., to make a judgement on the effects and impact of the changes 
introduced. In addition to the intrinsic difficulty of relating effects to causes in a 
single historical process, the task is complicated by the limited number of formal 
rigorous evaluations, and by data availability. 
 
 
2. Negative lists of medicines and co-payments 
 
It appears that the co-payment system, so far only applied to pharmaceuticals, is not 
intended to be increased nor extended to other health services. However, there is 
evidence that the level of co-payment is low in comparison with other EU countries, 
and it also represents a decreasing proportion of the price financed by the patient (see 
Table 1). However, it may be argued that some low-intensity co-payments might also   6 
be considered as an alternative revenue source for the public health system with less 
negative distributive effects than indirect taxes, if suitably designed.  
 
For pharmaceuticals, users pay 40% of the price of medicines prescribed by NHS 
doctors, with the exception of those aged over 65 and some specific groups (retired, 
handicapped and people who have suffered occupational accidents) and their 
dependents, for whom there is no co-payment. Another exception to drug co-payment 
is the case of chronic diseases. Only 10% co-payment is applied, with a maximum 
amount (3.01 euros for the year 2000), when NHS doctors prescribe drugs to 
consumers identified as chronic patients. Another exception to this rule is that applied 
to civil servants who are under the Mutualidad de Funcionarios de la Administración 
Civil del Estado (MUFACE) insurance system. MUFACE insurees, both employed and 
pensioners, make a 30% co-payment for all pharmaceutical products. The 79/1998 and 
128/2001 Bills established the present r egulation for orthopaedic prostheses: co-
payment stands at 40%, with a minimum of 30 euros, and each regional health service 
can decide the prices of orthopaedic products for outpatients. A catalogue establishes 
the products, the price and the public share (60%), including orthopaedic prostheses 
such as wheelchairs for the handicapped and special prostheses. For inpatient cases in 
which surgery is needed there is no co-payment for this process. 
 
What do we know about the effects of this co-payment system? F irst, drug price 
elasticity is low but not negligible (a 10% increase in the co-payment rate will reduce 
expenditure by 2.2%). Second, despite invariant normative co-payment rates, effective 
co-payment rates show a decreasing trend (15% of the consumer price in 1985, 8.9% in 
1995, and 7.1% in 2000). This trend can be attributed to the increase in exempted 
pharmaceutical consumption to a great extent due to population ageing, but it is also 
attributable to the existence of a notable level of fraud: a high proportion of co-
payments are avoided by using elderly members for the family’s prescriptions. Third, 
MUFACE pensioners pay 30% of the consumer price and their per capita expenditure 
is less than those included in the social security system, which indicates the potential   7 
scope for moral hazard. The effective co-payment rate for MUFACE insured 
population was 21.7 of the consumer price in 1991, and exactly the same rate in 1997. 
And fourth, current co-payments present a high level of concentration among 
individuals: 2% of the population concentrates one-third of co-payment revenue [9]. 
These observations clearly reveal that severe efficiency and even equity problems 
affect the present system.  
 
Low co-payments per prescription (i.e., between 0.6 and 1 euros) could also provide 
major additional revenues to regional governments even higher (i.e., between 249 and 
414 million euros in the year 2000). However, not only revenue but also efficiency 
objectives have to be considered in relation to co-payments. Low-intensity co-
payments may reduce moral hazard by means of low transaction costs. Negative low-
intensity co-payment effects on equity, which may appear when payments are 
concentrated on a small number of individuals, could be counteracted with the 
introduction of  co-payment caps and a suitably designed deduction in the personal 
income tax (fiscal expenses)2. However, co-payment policies restricted to drugs could 
produce a shift of consumption in other services, which should also be considered. 
 
Negative lists have  excluded some pharmaceuticals from public financing, being 
equivalent to setting a 100% co-payment rate. The Spanish government used this 
policy for the first time in 1993 (when the Socialists were in power) and then again in 
1998 (with the Popular party i n power) to control public pharmaceutical expenditure. 
These two negative lists led to the exclusion from public funding of 29% of the total 
pharmaceutical brands registered on the market [5]. 
 
Both experiences have shown limited effectiveness of negative  lists of drugs in 
reducing pharmaceutical expenditure. However, in addition to these control purposes, 
other clinical or epidemiological objectives are often used to argue in their favour. The 
Spanish 1993 bill was based on two main objectives: (a) to prioritise public financing   8 
for those drugs whose need or the severity of the illnesses for which they were used 
was greater, and (b) to exclude from public financing those drugs with low therapeutic 
value. Short-term effects showed a reduction in the number o f prescriptions in 1994, 
but a substitution effect is probably responsible for a subsequent increase in the 
following years in the number of prescriptions, with a higher average price per 
prescription.   
 
The government introduced a second list of excluded medicines in 1998 (834 products 
corresponding to 39 therapeutic groups). The delisting policy was agreed between the 
Ministry and the industry. Critics argued that cost containment criteria prevailed in 
the agreement, unlike in the case of the more pharmacologically oriented list 
introduced in 1993. In the 1998 list not even the short-term impact was observed, 
given the high rate of increase in public expenditure occurring in this year (above 
10%)3. This second list was fiercely opposed by the Andalusian r egional government, 
which decided to finance the consumption of excluded medicines with funds from its 
own budget [14]. 
 
The products included in the negative list of 1993 had been on the market for an 
average of 20.9 years, and those included in the 1998 list had been on the market for 
20.1 years. A large number of excluded medicines disappeared from the market in the 
following years: at the beginning of 2002, 40% of the medicines excluded in 1993 and 
25% of those excluded in 1998 were not available on the market [12].   
 
 
3. The reference pricing system 
 
3.1 Reference pricing policy 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
2 This measure could not properly work if a notable level of fraud resulted from it.   9 
 
In 1996 and 1997 a series of legislative reforms opened the way for the introduction of 
generic drugs and a reference pricing system in the Spanish pharmaceutical market. 
Reference pricing (RP) is equivalent to setting a co-payment consisting of a variable 
amount depending on the price of the selected drug, and which may be avoided if the 
drug price does not exceed the reference price.  
 
An RP system was effectively introduced  in Spain in December 2000. This system is 
applied to off-patent drugs with the same active ingredient (bio-equivalence). All the 
pharmaceutical products included in the same homogeneous group (identical RP) are 
bio-equivalent, and at least one of them has to be a generic product. 
 
For each homogeneous set of products a reference price is calculated on the basis of 
the weighted average (year on year) of the lowest-priced products that account for at 
least 20% of the market sales. If the difference between this calculated price and the 
highest price in the group is less than 15%, the reference price will be the result of 
applying a 10% reduction to the highest price (this achieving at least a 10% saving). If 
the difference between the calculated price and the  highest-priced product is more 
than 50%, the reference price is recalculated as exactly 50% of the highest-priced 
product (some potential savings thus being foregone). In no case will the reference 
price be lower than the generic with the lowest price. 
 
Given the conservative approach to RP adopted in Spain, a limited effect on 
expenditure is expected. The bio-equivalence requirement only allows the application 
of this system to a small market share, even though the Spanish pharmaceutical 
market is among those on which the market size of recently introduced drugs 
increases fastest. In fact, the Spanish market does not share two of the main features 
of the first countries to introduce an RP system (high prices and a well-developed 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
3  This remains true despite the fact that some authors reported direct short-run savings indicating a 
decline in public spending in the therapeutic subgroups that contained the excluded medicines [2].   10 
generic market). However, RP was presented politically as a measure to promote the 
generic market, despite the fact that the effective result could be the reverse. 
 
The RP system was applied to 114 homogeneous groups in December 2000. These 
groups totalled 590 products which accounted for 10% of public pharmaceutical 
expenditure. The RP system was updated and extended to another 28 homogeneous 
groups, comprising 113 products, in April 2002. 
 
As has been observed in experiences with reference pricing in other countries, these 
systems h ave produced short-term reductions in the insurer’s expenditure. However, 
they can only be applied to a small proportion of the pharmaceutical market. The 
result is that official estimated savings amount to only 1.2% of total public 
expenditure in pharmaceuticals in 2001. Saving estimates for the year 2002 reported 
by the pharmaceutical industry stand at 156 million euros valued at final prices (145 
million euros according to government estimates), which is nearly equivalent to 2% of 
public expenditure. Even with such low estimates, several factors clearly indicate that 
these figures are overstated. They include the effect of the compulsory price reduction 
imposed in conjunction with RP on all those products (copies) without demonstrated 
bio-equivalence. Furthermore, these estimations probably only include the pure price 
effect, and not other possible offsetting effects related to RP (higher prices for new 
products or delay in their launch, switching to non-referenced products, higher prices 
than without RP f or referenced products because of reduced incentives for generic 
competition, etc.). 
 
When the number of generic competitors is low, as was the case in Spain at the 
introduction of the reference pricing system, RP could be fixed arbitrarily above the 
marginal cost. If this were the case, then RP would perform against competition, given 
that when RP is fixed there are no incentives to price a product below the reference 
level if savings are accrued by the insurer [11]. Empirical studies on the impact of RP 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Substitution and innovations more than off-setted the direct savings.    11 
on prices for reference products in Germany and Sweden indicate that its contribution 
to decreasing prices is lower than direct observation suggests [15; 4].   
 
The RP system was implemented in conjunction with policy measures that 
compulsorily forced some products under the RP system to reduce their market prices 
to the reference price level. All those pharmaceutical products not officially recognised 
as bio-equivalents (copies), but included in the homogeneous RP groups, were 
compelled to fix a price equal to the reference level. This price reduction affected 193 
products in December 2000 and 25 products in April 2001. 
  
In June 2001 the government reinforced the RP system with a compulsory 15% 
reduction in the market price of 5 active ingredients (enalapril, famotidine, atenolol, 
omeprazol and ziprofloxacin) in order to bring their prices nearer RP levels. 
Compulsory price reduction affected those products whose market price was more 
than 15% higher than the average of the three least expensive ones in the  same 
homogeneous group. This measure clearly indicates that in some cases pharmaceutical 
firms maintained a price above the reference level, and it also indicates that, in fact, 
the government has been tempted to use this reimbursement mechanism as a price 
regulation system. The government’s justification for this imposed price reduction was 
that there was not enough competition in these markets even after the introduction of 
the RP system. 
 
The regional devolution of health services management to the autonomous 
communities (ACs) completed in January 2002 allowed all these regional authorities 
to introduce their own procurement mechanisms. In September 2001 the regional 
government of Andalusia4 introduced a new pharmaceutical procurement mechanism 
based on R P, which competes with the RP system applied by the central government. 
In this regional RP system, product coverage is defined by all those active ingredients 
                                                                   
4 Health care services were devolved to the regional government of Andalusia in 1984. This AC included 
nearly 19.52% of the Spanish population in January 1999.     12 
with more than two products on the market, which are being sold at different 
consumer prices. This regional RP system covers 239 active ingredients with 591 
homogeneous groups (2,900 products), sales of which account for 35% of the 
prescription market. Under this RP system all products with the same active 
ingredient and presentation are considered homogeneous and the same reference price 
will be applied to them. Potential product coverage of RP as applied in Andalusia is 
wider than in the Spanish RP system; however, the main problem of this regional RP 
system is that it requires prescriptions to be m ade out using the name of the active 
ingredient and not the commercial name of the product. In June 2002, 9% of 
prescriptions in Andalusia were made out using the name of the active ingredient.  
 
In Andalusia the reference price level is set at the level of the higher price of the two 
lowest-priced products for each active ingredient. Reference prices are updated every 
six months or automatically if the price of the reference product is modified. This 
regional government agreed with the pharmacies to dispense the lowest-priced 
product for each active ingredient, independently of its generic status.  
 
This reference price applied in Andalusia is on average 17% (2.90 euros in June 2001) 
below the reference price fixed by the central government. It is important to note that 
the RP system set up in Andalusia covers all the ten top-selling products in this 




3.2 Price trends after the reference pricing system 
 
In  this section of the paper we provide descriptive evidence of the evolution of 
consumer prices for each product covered by the RP system for a period of 10 months   13 
before and 10 months after the introduction of this policy in December 2000. As a 
selective illustration of this evolution, we concentrate our attention on a sample of four 
top-selling active ingredients out of those covered by the RP system since December 
2000, which comprises 13 homogeneous groups and 228 products: ranitidine, captopril, 
omeprazol and fluoxetine. Descriptive trends for these four active ingredients are 
summarised in Tables 2, 3 and 4, corresponding to the period February 2000 to 
September 2001. 
 
[ Insert Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 about here ] 
 
 
In Tables 2, 3 and 4 we examine the evolution of the number of suppliers on the 
market for each homogeneous group, the evolution of the lowest and the highest price 
in the group, the reference pricing at the national level and that applied in Andalusia, 
and the number of products with a price equal to or higher than the reference one. We 
provide information for the first and the last month in a period of ten months before 
RP introduction: February 2000 and November 2000. We also provide information on 
the preceding variables for the first month of application of the RP system (December 
2000) and ten months after its introduction (September 2001). Information on monthly 
individual prices was obtained from the database of the Directorate-General of 
Pharmacy and Health Products (Spanish Ministry of Health and Consumption).  
 
Three main common descriptive trends can be observed. First, brand products, copies 
and generic products with a price higher than the reference price immediately reduced 
their price to this reference level in December 2000. In 11 of the 13 homogeneous 
groups examined, the reference level has acted as a price cap. RP has been very 
effective in reducing the highest price to the reference level, and its effect has, in fact, 
been very similar to maximum price regulation. In September 2001, only four products 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
5 As an example, the maximum reimbursable price for omeprazol 20 mg and 14 tablets in June 2001 
was 24.89 euros according to the reference price level  fixed by the central government, and only 5.95   14 
out of 228 were priced above the reference level. A total of 102 products (44.7% of the 
sample) were priced exactly at the reference level. And the remaining 122 products 
were priced below the reference level. Average non-weighted reduction of the highest 
price in the first month of RP use (December 2000) in relation to the preceding month 
was 19.2% for ranitidine, 23.8% for captopril, 0% for omeprazol, and 10% for 
fluoxetine. 
 
Second, the number of suppliers on the market for these 13 homogeneous groups and 
four active ingredients continuously increased during both the period before and the 
period after the introduction of RP. In the 10-month period before RP, 33 generic 
products entered the market of these groups. In the 10-month period after the change 
this figure was even higher: 49 generic products entered the market between 
December 2000 and September 2001. The price of new generic entrants in the period 
after RP was in all cases lower than the lowest preceding price. This is also a result of 
direct price regulation forcing new entrants to price below the lowest observed price on 
the market as a justification for its introduction. Individual price data after RP show 
that the only reason for decreases in the lowest price in each homogeneous group lies 
in the entry of new generic suppliers into the market with an imposed lower price.  
  
Third and last, the price of all products already on the market before the introduction 
of RP with a price equal to or lower than the reference level  remained absolutely 
constant6 during the period after, and did not experience any price competition effect 
because of RP or because of the lower price of new entrants7. At the same time, data 
suggest that RP has not been effective in reducing the price of products with a price 
initially below the reference level. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
euros according to the regional government of Andalusia. 
6 Individual maximum prices for each product are directly regulated in Spain, and this is true even for 
generics. Therefore, price regulation prevented price increases for generics with prices lower than the 
reference level.  
7 The number of generics in the active ingredient group is habitually used in the literature as a 
measure of competition.   15 
What are the implications of these descriptive trends in the evolution of prices for 
ranitidine, captopril, omeprazol and fluoxetine after the introduction of RP? The RP 
system does not seem to have provided effective incentives for consumer price 
competition as was intended. However, the observed increasing number of suppliers 
on the market should be considered as an indication of potential higher competition in 
the market. In our opinion, there i s strong dynamic price competition in the Spanish 
generic market (at least for the four active ingredients observed in this paper). 
However, as a result of certain features of the implementation of the RP system (i.e., 
the level of the reference price, its updating lag, the substitution authorisation, etc.) 
and the regulated payment system for pharmacies (higher generic markup for 
pharmacies), price competition is mainly taking the form of lower acquisition costs for 
pharmacies rather than lower prices for the public payer and the patients (competitive 
discounting to pharmacies). It could even be hypothesised that the effort of the 
regulator in forcing lower prices for new generic entrants could represent a 
competitive disadvantage for these suppliers. 
 
The generic market share was very low until 1999, but it rapidly increased from 2.1% 
in January 2000 to 3.9% in December 2000, according to IMS data. However, the 
generic market share has not increased since the introduction of the RP system in 
December 2000. The size of the generic market was 3.3% in April 2001. 
 
As Danzon [3] observed in a comparative analysis of RP policies, there is international 
evidence of the limitations of RP systems in encouraging price reductions below the 
reference level, and this is one of the main problems in the design of this policy for off-
patent bio-equivalent drugs. For example, there is evidence in the Netherlands that 
the RP system and the substitution authorisation to pharmacists resulted in 
competitive discounting to pharmacists and failed to benefit payers and patients [3].  
 
Public information from Spanish wholesalers offered to retail pharmacies provided 
information on the existence of large discounts on the price of generic products. Given   16 
that Spanish law does not allow discounts in the pharmaceutical market, generic 
suppliers offer additional free quantities of their products to the pharmacy. For 
example, in May 2002 one major wholesaler was offering two free packages of some 
generic presentations of omeprazol, ranitidine, enalapril, ciprofloxacin and amoxiciline 
with clavulanic acid when the pharmacy bought four packages at the official price 
(4+2). The equivalent discount on the price of the generic product implied by this 
transaction would be 33%.  
 
It appears to be very contradictory to attempt to solve some of the problems related to 
the details of a policy designed to improve price competition for off-patent drugs, such 
as the RP system, by augmenting the level of intervention in the pharmaceutical 
market, without a ddressing the inefficient incentives that remain at the root of these 
problems. The fact that the prices of some products covered by the RP system remain 
above the RP level has been interpreted by the regulator as a result of insufficient 
competition in the market, and in some cases additional price regulation measures 
have been adopted. The existence of unequivocal signs of price competition in the form 
of lowered generic acquisition costs for retail pharmacies, and even the implicit 
incentive to dispense  higher-priced generics to the patient, was simply responded by 
the Ministry of Health, for example in June 2002, with statements to the effect that, 
according to the Spanish law on medicines, this practice amounted to committing 
administrative offence that could be punished with a fine of between 600 and 3000 
euros.  
 
A paradoxical example of increased regulation to supposedly reinforce RP may be 
found in the compulsory price reduction imposed in June 2001 on the prices of 
enalapril, famotidine, atenolol, o meprazol and ziprofloxacin presentations included in 
the RP system. Consider the case of omeprazol as a representative example of this 
situation. In May 2001, six months after the introduction of RP, only three omeprazol 
products (20 mg and 14 tablets) out of 17 were priced above the reference level. Seven 
new generics of omeprazol 20 mg and 14 tablets entered the market between May and   17 
September. The reference price level established centrally in December 2000 was 
24.89 euros, but the lowest price in September 2001 was 4.2 times lower (5.95 euros, 
the reference price adopted in Andalusia in September 2001). Anecdotal evidence of 
implicit discounts to retail pharmacies for omeprazol acquisitions could be observed on 
the market at this time. In this situation, the central government argued that 
consumer prices did not descend precisely because of a lack of competition, and 
imposed a unilateral 15% price reduction in June 2001. This imposed price reduction 
not only affected products priced above the reference level but also reduced the price of 




4. Changes in the pharmacies’ payment system 
 
In the Spanish health care system prescription medicines can only be distributed 
through pharmacies. The density of pharmacies is one of the highest in the world: 
there is a pharmacy for each 2,000 inhabitants. Even the actual number of 
pharmacies has been rapidly increasing in recent years: from 15,000 in 1977 to 20,000 
in 2001. P harmacies are still strictly regulated; a Degree in Pharmacy is required in 
order to be the holder, and there are several limitations in the maximum number of 
pharmacies according to the population and the distance between pharmacies. 
Regulatory changes introduced in 1996 and 1997 slightly relaxed some imposed 
limitations: the minimum number of inhabitants to authorise a new pharmacy was 
reduced, with different criteria operating in each CA; and at the same time, the 
pharmacy’s timetable for attending the public was made more flexible. 
  
The payment system for pharmacy services has until now been based on a markup 
calculated as a fixed proportion of the consumer price before taxes. This system 
provides incentives to increase pharmacy revenues by selling medicines with higher 
prices. The Ministry of Health has yielded to the temptation to unilaterally reduce   18 
markups using monopsony power; however, these measures have had only short-term 
effects, as incentives remain unaltered. For example, in 1997 markups were reduced 
to 11% for wholesalers and 27.9% for pharmacies. This measure represented a margin 
reduction of one point for wholesalers and two points for pharmacies. In 1999 a 
further unilateral reduction of the wholesale margin to 9.6% was introduced. 
 
This m argin payment system, and the linear changes made to it, does not consider 
any relationship between marginal costs of pharmacy services and marginal revenues. 
The result is that it does not provide incentives for the dispensation of lower-priced 
drugs, and does not treat with equity the significant heterogeneity between 
pharmacies (population served, location, costs, etc.).  
 
The first major attempt to partially modify this linear margin system was introduced 
in the year 20008 (Table 6). The changes introduced in this year were intended to fix a 
decreasing margin according to the product price and the pharmacy’s volume of sales, 
and to promote generic sales. First, markups for wholesalers and pharmacies were 
maintained at the prevailing level (9.6% and 27.9% respectively) only for products 
with an ex-factory price equal to or lower than 78.34 euros. Second, a monetary 
margin cap was established for products with an ex-factory price above 78.34 euros (a 
fixed margin of 33.54 euros for pharmacies, and a fixed m argin of 8.32 euros for 
wholesalers). Third, the markup applied to generic products with an ex-factory price 
equal to or lower than 78.34 euros was increased to 33% in order to encourage generic 
sales. And fourth, a discount scale was introduced that increased according to the 
monthly volume of sales to the public payer, valued at the consumer price including 
VAT. The monthly discount ranges from 673.13 euros, applied to pharmacies selling 
more than 37,263.75 euros, to a maximum of 22,153.31 euros, for volumes of sales 
above 252,425.08 euros. 
 
[ Insert Table 6 about here ]   19 
 
 
The changes made to the pharmacies’ payment system in the year 2000 introduced a 
variable markup according to two criteria, which modified the long-standing consumer 
price proportional m argin in Spanish pharmacies. First, the new system was designed 
to encourage generic drug sales by introducing a margin 5.1 points above that of non-
generic products. This is probably one of the main reasons for the increase in the 
generic market share. However, the efficiency of this measure is clear only when 
generic prices are significantly lower than those of non-generic products. Unjustified 
market distortions may appear when generic prices are nearly equal to that of the 
innovative product, or even worse, when the generic price is higher than that of other 
products with the same active ingredient, as occurs in some cases. The higher margin 
for generics provides incentives to sell the generic with the highest price. A variable 
margin independent of generic status and based on differential prices seems more 
efficient. 
 
And, second, the average markup for pharmacies decreases continuously with the 
volume of sales. In the case of non-generic drugs with a consumer price of up to 78.34 
euros, the average marginal rate is 27.9% of sales valued at consumer prices when the 
pharmacy’s monthly sales are not above 27,646.56 euros. This group may include up 
to 60% of Spanish pharmacies. The average margin decreases to 19.124% for those 
pharmacies whose monthly sales  reach 252,425.08 euros. The marginal rate ranges 
from a maximum of 27.9% to a minimum of nearly 14.9% for the highest volume of 
sales, according to the consumer price before taxes. The financial effect of this 
measure on pharmaceutical public spending has  been very significant. During the 
period of application in 2000 it amounted to 63 million euros9, which is nearly 
equivalent to an annual decrease of more than 2% in public expenditures (and an 
average discount rate over the preceding pharmacy reimbursement of over 7%). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
8 Real Decreto-Ley 5/2000, June 23rd.  
9 Farmaindustria. Memoria anual 2000.   20 
 
This represents a typical one-off measure whose effects are limited to the short term. 
Public pharmaceutical expenditure increased 7.46% in 2000, but without the change 
in pharmacy margins established in June 2000, the increase would have b een 8.47%. 
Regional savings accrued from the application of this measure will be higher in those 
regions with a larger population per pharmacy (such as the Canary Islands and the 
Basque Country).  
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that in some cases pharmacies  have responded to this 
policy by artificially redistributing sales from one month to another, and also from one 
pharmacy to another, when they report to the public insurer, in order to avoid lower 
marginal markups and obtain a higher average remuneration.  Given the observed 
cyclical trends in monthly pharmaceutical sales, it would probably be more suitable to 
consider yearly sales as the basis for establishing marginal markups for pharmacies.    
 
Mixed payment systems for Spanish pharmacies have been proposed by some analysts 
[13] with a view to reducing inappropriate marginal incentives. A mixed system could 
consider different components in the payment system: a fixed amount per dispensed 
prescription [1]; the reimbursement of the cost of the product; a fee for some pharmacy 
care services under contract; a minimum guaranteed revenue for pharmacies located 
in small towns; etc.   
 
 
5. General agreements between the government and the industry 
 
The Ministry of Health and Consumption and Farmaindustria (the Spanish 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association) signed agreements in 1996, 1998 and 
2001 that involved increased repayments by the industry to the public health care 
system. In 1998 repayments by the industry totalled 235.3 million euros, equivalent to 
4.1%  of public pharmaceutical expenditure. The 1996 agreement established a 4%   21 
rebate on laboratory prices, and an increasing scale of discounts on additional sales 
when sales of publicly financed medicines increased annually more than 2.6%. The 
maximum marginal discount could not be above the gross profit margin (56.7% on the 
consumer price) for additional sales. A similar agreement was signed in 1998. These 
are overall ex-post agreements and are not related to price-volume agreements. 
 
However, this policy has been challenged by non-Farmaindustria members, and also 
by firms that did not sign the repayment agreements. These firms have been agreeing 
to large rebates on sales of single drugs with the regional NHS authorities and with 
hospitals. Farmaindustria cancelled the government-industry agreement unilaterally 
in July 1999 after disagreement with the government over the introduction of the 
reference pricing system. The government reacted with a compulsory price reduction 
introduced in November 1999 (around 6%), which was designed to more than 
compensate the previously agreed repayment [14].  
 
A new industry-government agreement was signed in 2001 with the intention of 
providing a steady three-year framework for the pharmaceutical sector. The Ministry 
of Health  and Consumption accepted to voluntarily limit cost containment policy 
measures to those included in the agreement and not to adopt any other unilateral 
measure. The agreement involved the promotion of generic drugs, the introduction of 
new homogeneous groups into the reference pricing system, and the annual revision of 
the level of reference prices. The maximum annual reduction in public expenditure 
attributed to these measures cannot be above 105.18 million euros. Lower impacts will 
not be compensated by t he industry. At the same time, the Ministry of Health and 
Consumption undertook to adopt measures to soften the negative impact of parallel 
trade; and to propose to the government tax deductions for expenses and investments 
in research, development and innovation in strategic lines.  
 
In the 2001 agreement, Farmaindustria undertook to finance a publicly managed 
research fund. The minimum amount to be paid by the industry to this new fund is   22 
60.1 million euros in 2002, 60.1 in 2003, and 30.05 in 2004. This a mount could be 
augmented according to the annual rate of increase in public pharmaceutical 
expenditure. The maximum annual payment to the fund cannot be above 99.17 
million euros. The annual amount to be paid by the industry to the fund will be 
calculated  as follows. First, a maximum annual increase in the amount of NHS 
prescriptions (excluding hospital consumption) valued at laboratory prices is 
established. This maximum annual rate depends on the nominal GDP growth rate. If 
the GDP growth rate is lower than or equal to 5.5, then the maximum increase in 
drug sales to the NHS will be the GDP rate plus one point10. If the GDP growth rate is 
above 5.5, then the maximum increase in drug sales to the NHS will be 6.5. Second, 
the industry’s annual contribution to the fund will be calculated as 33.06 million euros 
for each point above the maximum agreed increase, which depends on the rate of 
increase of the GDP. A fixed contribution will be deducted from this figure. And third, 
the agreement will be revised if drug  sales to the NHS increase annually more than 3 
points above the maximum fixed level.  
  
The most important positive aspect of this government-industry agreement is that of 
reducing uncertainty; it provides a steady and predictable financial perspective for 
agents, pharmaceutical industry and public insurer, for the period 2002-2004. Another 
advantage of the 2001 agreement is that a certain proportion of the repayment is 
related to the overall growth rate in pharmaceutical sales to the NHS. This introduces 
overall incentives to restrict sale increases, despite the fact that the incentives at the 
firm level depend on the distribution criteria for the repayment among firms, and are 
difficult to predict. There are also aggregate incentives not to exceed the maximum 
allowed sales increase according to the agreement, because in this case firms will face 
regulatory uncertainty. Also in this case, individual firms’ incentives may be different. 
 
It should be noted that the 1998 agreement between the pharmaceutical industry and 
the Spanish government established a fixed repayment amount. This agreement 
                                                                   
10 The official estimate for the expected nominal GDP rate of growth in 2002 is 5.3%.   23 
specified a total repayment for each year, which would be apportioned, for example, 
according to the market share. This case could be compared to the effect of fixed 
revenue taxation. An increase in the sales of firm i, without a reduction in the sales of 
the rest of the firms, will reduce the average tax on revenues. In this case marginal 
taxation for firm i will be decreasing and lower than average taxation. Then, 
incentives to increase pharmaceutical consumption will not disappear.  
 
Let the average repayment rate per euro of prescription sales be t. If a firm makes an 
additional sale of 1 euro without reducing other companies’ sales, in the fixed revenue 
taxation case, the industry’s overall repayment burden will not be affected. Then, it is 
clear that an increase in the volume of sales reduces the value of t because the 
marginal repayment rate is lower than the average (and equal to zero). Under the 
2001 agreement, given the existence of a fixed prepayment, the average repayment 
rate is decreasing for overall sale increases not above 1.8 points over the maximum 
reference level. However, above this growth rate, the overall marginal repayment rate 
is increasing and higher  than average. In fact, at the aggregate level and above the 
preceding growth level, repayments act as a profit sharing mechanism. Of course, firm 
incentives will depend on the criteria applied in the distribution of the repayment 
among individual firms. 
 
Notwithstanding, some important problems remain to be solved by the agreement, 
and also, some potential problems may arise from its application. First, the maximum 
annual repayment coming from this agreement is lower than that obtained in 1996, 
1997 and 1998, even in monetary terms; furthermore, it is also decreasing in real 
terms. The net financial impact for the public budget will be lowered by fiscal 
deductions in the taxation on firms’ profits in the corporate tax. The repayment is 
considered as a cost a nd it will correspondingly reduce taxable firms’ profits. A new 
10% deduction on research, development and innovation has been introduced in the 
Spanish profit tax in 2002. This deduction will represent a major reduction in the cost 
of the agreement for the industry.    24 
 
Second, under the new agreement, repayments will be compulsorily devoted to public 
medical research, which limits the autonomy of resource allocation decisions by 
central and AC governments and introduces instability in the availability of public 
medical research funds. The amount of the repayments depends on the level of 
regional pharmaceutical expenditures, but repayments are not made to those regions 
with higher increasing pharmaceutical expenditure rates. The agreement means that 
drug consumption has to increase for more public funds for medical research to be 
obtained.  
 
Third, the agreed repayments may not be enough to discourage marginal sales by 
individual pharmaceutical firms in all circumstances. The reason for this is that, 
given the existence of a fixed agreed repayment amount, the optimum increase in 
pharmaceutical sales is 1.8 points above the maximum fixed level for 2002 and 2003. 
As an example, if the annual increase in nominal GDP is 5.0% in 2002, then public 
pharmaceutical prescriptions valued at laboratory prices will optimally increase 7.8 
points, which represents an elasticity of pharmaceutical spending to GDP of 1.56. 
Elasticity of pharmaceutical expenditure valued at consumer prices to GDP was 1.78 
during the period 1990-1997. 
 
Fourth, some problems may appear when allocating the repayment contribution to 
individual firms. If the amount of the repayment is allocated to individual firms 
according to annual sale increases or their market share, then, for example, generic 
producers with an increasing market share will be penalised by this system. 
Incentives remain for individual firms such as generic or low-price producers not to 
adhere to the agreement and to offer rebates to wholesalers and pharmacies. 
 
Fifth and finally, the  2001 government-industry agreement means that the public 
third-party payers forego adopting other so-called “structural measures” (cost 
containment) aimed at controlling public pharmaceutical expenditure. In fact, the   25 
industry argues that even the meagre estimated effect of RP is enough to damp the 
maximum yearly impact of these so-called structural measures as established in the 
2001 agreement. 
 
It is important to be note that the agreement with the pharmaceutical industry was 
obtained by the central Ministry of Health and Consumption at the same moment as, 
in January 2002, the devolution of health services management to regional 
governments was completed, along with a reform in the regional mechanism of 
allocation of public funds (intergovernmental grants, tax revenues and fiscal 
accountability). Thus, some problems in the relationship and distribution of powers 
between central government and ACs may arise. First, some decentralised ACs 
complain that the agreement puts an arbitrary limit on their autonomous right to 
implement cost containment measures in the near future. And second, there may be 
problems regarding the regional allocation of this repayment, especially when the 
repayment is understood as a rebate on pharmaceutical sales to the various ACs. In 
fact, the AC of Andalusia has refused to accept this agreement with the industry. 
 
At the end of 2001 the central government reached agreements for the period 2000-
2004 with the two interest organisations of pharmacies (Consejo General de Colegios 
Oficiales de Farmacéuticos and Federación Empresarial de Farmacéuticos Españoles) 
and also with the interest organisation of the wholesalers (Federación de 
Distribuidores Farmacéuticos). In both cases, the Ministry of Health and 
Consumption renounce the introduction of changes in the payment system (markups) 
in exchange for some repayments related to sales increases. 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
In addition to the intrinsic difficulty of relating effects to causes in pharmaceutical 
policy evaluation and the multiplicity of goals, the limited number of formal rigorous   26 
evaluations complicates the task. Moreover, the debate on Spanish pharmaceutical 
policy is very hot in the political arena. Spanish politicians’ view of the 
appropriateness and the effects of pharmaceutical policies tend to represent more 
their present position on the political scene  – government or opposition  – than 
evidence-based criteria. Clearly, this is not the best environment for an objective and 
scientific evaluation of changes in pharmaceutical reimbursement (evidence-based 
policy). 
 
It is very common in health care analysis to confuse the price and cost of health care 
with the observed expenditure level. This is especially true in the case of Spanish 
pharmaceutical expenditure. In the Spanish political debate, the high proportion of 
public health expenditures devoted to pharmaceuticals (see Table 1) is often taken as 
an indication of inefficiency. We argue that this measure does not provide any insight 
as to the efficiency of pharmaceuticals in the Spanish health system. It can be argued 
that some new technologies such as oral antibiotics, and medications to treat ulcers or 
mental illness may have helped to reduce inpatient costs, but this is not true for a 
large number of new products introduced on t o the market with high prices. High 
pharmaceutical expenditure levels could be very efficient if they provide significant 
health improvements. Equally, lower expenditure levels may be very inefficient when 
financing pharmaceuticals without demonstrated effectiveness.  
 
There is a vast amount of evidence of over-consumption, inadequate prescription, and 
a high cost of negative effects associated with pharmaceutical consumption in Spain. 
It has been reported that problems related to the use of medicines account for 12% of 
urgent admissions in a tertiary hospital [16]. However, the success of pharmaceutical 
policies cannot be measured only by its cost containment contribution; “robbing where 
the money is” – that is, in the overall pharmaceutical expenditure – is not always the 
best guide for efficiency improvement. It is even more important to be selective, and to 
observe the impact of pharmaceutical policies on the behaviour of patient, prescriber,   27 
industry, wholesalers and pharmacies in order to introduce incentives that are more 
oriented to clinical effectiveness, service quality and efficiency.  
 
In this paper, without any pretension to comprehensiveness, several recent 
reimbursement policies applied to pharmaceuticals have been analysed: the second 
negative  list, the reference pricing system, the payment system to pharmacies, and 
the industry-government agreements. All these measures represent a renewed and 
notable effort to improve public purchasing of pharmaceuticals and to introduce 
efficiency oriented changes in the incentives of the agents in the Spanish 
pharmaceutical market. Notwithstanding, not only the overall impact of these 
measures, in terms of cost, efficiency and health effects, remains to be established, but 
also several likely limitations of these interventions have been highlighted in this 
paper. All these recent measures share some limitations at their origin that probably 
affect and impose limits on their effective impact: they are more industry than 
demand-side oriented; they are designed more as directive regulation measures than 
as incentive pricing policies; the goal of short-term cost containment appears to be 
their only criterion for success; they are directed at controlling prices rather than 
reducing quantities and improving quality; a nd they are designed to influence 
pharmaceutical expenditure as if it were an isolated input in the health care 
production process.   
 
Recent cost containment policies in Spain have been focused especially on measures 
oriented to the industry side, which f or the most part have been supported by the 
monopsony purchasing power of the public sector. The reverse is that demand-side 
policies  – based on patient and, more importantly, on prescriber incentives  – have 
been very weak. This is due mainly to the stricter short-term budget constraints 
imposed on health care expenditure, and the fact that public pharmaceutical 
expenditure shows the highest rates of increase among health inputs in Spain. In fact, 
recent reform trends appear to be guided (sometimes confused) by observed monthly 
rates of increase in pharmaceutical expenditure rather than by incentives to improve   28 
efficiency. Nationwide pharmaceutical policies have had scant influence on 
prescribing decisions with prescribing guidelines, prescribing budgets, treatment 
protocols and rational prescribing. Organisational reforms in the Spanish health care 
system should promote physician capitation including prescription drug costs in order 
to align physicians’ interests with resource constraints. 
 
Until very recently, price regulation has been the most important cost containment 
measure in Spain. In theory, the present price regulation system, established in 1990 
[18], regulates the price of each individual product based on its costs, and it is 
intended to regulate the rate of return. Additionally to the inherent difficulty (indeed, 
impossibility) of establishing the cost of each input for every product in a market 
characterised by extremely high and non-separable and internationalised costs of 
innovation and development, the conditions on the EU market are in effect weakening 
the use of this regulation system and giving more importance to the observed price in 
other European countries (external reference pricing).  
 
In fact, the price for innovative products entering the market is established at a 
similar level to the observed price in those EU countries with lower prices (France and 
Italy). However, the price of the products that have been on the market for some years 
suffers a progressive erosion because there are n o automatic or explicit criteria for 
yearly updates to this price. The result is that many old and very effective products 
show a low level and a decreasing trend in real prices, and this situation creates 
strong incentives for the pharmaceutical companies to introduce new higher-priced 
products on to the market that do not represent any significant improvement in 
effectiveness. Promotional efforts are then concentrated by the industry on these new 
and more expensive products, and high-powered incentives exist for products recently 
introduced on to the Spanish market to acquire a large market share very fast. The 
distribution of pharmaceutical sales on the Spanish market according to the date of 
approval indicates that in the year 2000 39.5% of these sales c orresponded to   29 
medicines with 5 years or less on the market, and 42.5% corresponded to medicines 
with 6 or less years on the market [7].   
 
It may also be stated that, despite the introduction of a reference pricing system in 
2000, pricing regulation and r eimbursement decisions have been neither adequately 
related nor clearly separated. This fact has become even more important following the 
completion of the devolution of health services management to regional governments 
in January 2002. In fact, now that the devolution is complete, the central government 
remains as the regulatory agency of the pharmaceutical market, but purchasing 
power and budget responsibility belong exclusively to regional governments acting as 
insurers and payers. Purchasing power may  be exerted in a decentralised 
environment by each regional government; however, given the small size of some 
regions, the pure decentralised model may not always be the best option for regional 
governments to negotiate with pharmaceutical suppliers11.   
 
Negative or positive lists (coverage decisions) should be more guided by evidence-
based criteria, including information from economic evaluation. Health economic 
evaluation criteria are absolutely insufficient and unreliable for practical use in the 
Spanish  health care system. Reimbursement should be designed to favour the use of 
effective drugs and avoid payment for ineffective ones. In the same way, 
reimbursement should be more guided by differences in reimbursement rates 
representing differences in effectiveness. The present prevailing use of the short-term 
rate of increase in Spanish public pharmaceutical expenditure to guide non-
coordinated coverage decisions, both at the regional and at the national level, may 
represent a potential threat for effectiveness and efficiency, may introduce significant 
inefficient distortions into the market, and may increase the administrative burden, 
when they provide incentives to confuse price with the cost of health care. 
Pharmaceutical coverage decisions appear to be excessively influenced by these short-  30 
term budgetary implications, as may be observed by the introduction of barriers to the 
prescription of some expensive medicines in the form of special authorisations, the 
price level being used as the only (arbitrary) criterion for reducing effective coverage, 
without any consideration of effectiveness or cost-effectiveness criteria.  
 
Given that there is no reason to restrict post-patent competition, RP applied to off-
patent and bio-equivalent medicines may represent an optimal insurance policy in the 
Spanish pharmaceutical market. However, the challenge with this reimbursement 
policy is how to design appropriate stimuli for the effects of price competition to be 
captured by the payer [3]. This problem is related to generic substitution and not only 
strictly to RP systems. Incentives for suppliers to set prices below the RP would 
require increased pharmacy revenues when selling products priced below the 
reference level. Revenues should be directly related to price difference, and they 
should be independent of generic or brand status, and related exclusively to the price. 
However, incentives for competitive discounts to pharmacies will remain if 
pharmacists do not receive the whole difference. Then, another requirement would be 
to establish a Spanish reference level closer to the lowest observed price on the 
market at any moment.       
 
There is wide variation internationally in the criteria used to set the reference price. 
However, from the theoretical point of view, for RP s ystems applied to off-patent 
products the reference level should mimic the competitive price (the marginal cost). 
Then, usually, there is no reason not to fix it at the level of the lowest observed price 
on the market. Huskamp et al [8] even suggest establishing the reference level in a 
competitive tendering process rather than on the basis of observed prices. Reference 
levels in Spain, as can be observed in Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5, have remained markedly 
above the observed lowest price. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
11 An alternative could be to retain a centralised purchasing agency to negotiate with the industry, as 
in the case of the not-for-profit Pharmac in New Zealand, which was formerly owned by regional   31 
As a procurement mechanism and to split public procurement from regulation, price-
volume agreements negotiated with each pharmaceutical firm could fix the volume 
that may be sold (micro approach), according to the budget impact established in the 
application. This price-volume could be designed as an incentive regulation tool and 
could be negotiated by public purchasing organisations (payers): for example, sliding 
scales sharing the risk (price decreases) of higher reimbursement costs between the 
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Table 1. Recent evolution of pharmaceutical expenditure in Spain 
 





































1991  166  120  72.3  16.9  0.9  10.5  114.5 
1992  181  132  72.9  17.2  1.0  9.9  129.0 
1993  189  137  72.5  17.0  1.0  9.5  142.2 
1994  188  142  75.5  17.8  1.0  9.2  154.4 
1995  210  159  75.8  19.0  1.0  8.9  162.8 
1996  226  173  76.5  19.6  1.1  8.5  171.8 
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Sources: OECD Health Data File 2002, National Institute of Statistics, and Farmaindustria. 
 
Notes: 
a: Per capita US$ purchasing power parity. 
b: Corresponding to the national health system. 
c: Consumer price less patient co-payment. Base year 1990 = 100.   35 
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Table 6. Pharmaceutical distribution margins in Spain since January 2000 
 
  Wholesalers  Retail pharmacists 
Generics 
-  Ex-factory price = 78.34 euros 
 
 
-  Ex-factory price > 78.34 euros 
 










Non-generic proprietary medicinal 
products 
-  Ex-factory price = 78.34 euros 
 
 
-  Ex-factory price > 78.34 euros 
 
 






27.9% of the retail 




Source: Farmaindustria (2001). 
 
 
 